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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF 





Regulatory cooperation is far from new, and the transatlantic variety in 
particular has long been at the forefront of its development.1 Approaching 
regulatory cooperation as an effort solely to harmonize or mutually recognize 
existing rules risks foregoing learning opportunities that cooperation provides 
through variation across legal systems.2 With the need to adopt a dynamic 
approach to trade agreements3 comes proceduralization of bilateral regulatory 
cooperation: not the rules themselves, but the procedures for producing them, 
become the object of cooperation. The compatibility of domestic structures for 
producing rules and regulation becomes crucial to the success of regulatory 
cooperation as a pathway to further economic integration.4 Contemporary 
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 1.  See generally TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Mark A. Pollack 
& Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001); TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS 
AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter PROBLEMS]; George 
A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation between the European Commission and U.S. Administrative 
Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 933 (1996); Giandomenico Majone, International Regulatory 
Cooperation: A Neo-Institutionalist Approach, in PROBLEMS, supra; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
Globalization and Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Proposals for EU–U.S. Initiatives to Further 
Constitutionalize International Law, in PROBLEMS, supra.  
 2.  See generally Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International 
Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015.  
 3.  See, e.g., Boris Rigod, Trade in Goods under the Korea–EU FTA: Market Access and 
Regulatory Measures, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SOUTH KOREA: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
STRENGTHENING TRADE, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS 86 (James Harrison ed., 2013) 
(analyzing the EU–Korea free trade agreement as an example of a “living instrument” with provisions 
for cooperation and consultations by committees and working groups functioning as an in-built 
mechanism for filling lacunae in domestic regulation).  
 4.  See Susanne Lütz, Back to the Future? The Domestic Sources of Transatlantic Regulation, 18 
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. (SPECIAL ISSUE) iii (2011) (mapping the domestic factors that hamper 
cooperation or conflict in transatlantic regulation); Kai Raustiala, The Architecture of International 
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 57 
(2002) (analyzing the role of “agency-to-agency cooperation” addressing domestic rules as a vehicle for 
MEUWESE_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2016  1:25 PM 
154 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:153 
regulatory cooperation efforts in trade contexts are increasingly focused on 
minimizing future regulatory barriers through joint procedures in order to avoid 
freezing in time the results of regulatory trade agreements. Recent efforts to 
advance transatlantic regulatory cooperation have taken this procedural 
approach to the next level, as evidenced by the draft textual proposals for the 
regulatory coherence chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) agreement, an envisaged free trade agreement being 
negotiated between the United States and the European Union (EU). It 
appears that TTIP will lean on the idea of a permanent bilateral regulatory 
cooperation mechanism.5 
TTIP is not the first attempt at mutually streamlining procedures for the 
creation of regulation as a way to reduce regulatory barriers between the 
United States and the EU.6 Negotiation texts published by the European 
Commission (EC) reveal some novel mechanisms being proposed for inclusion 
in TTIP, however. Instead of the usual joint-consultation forums, such as the 
Transatlantic Financial Services Regulatory Dialogue, the idea is to establish a 
Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB) composed of senior regulators from both 
sides that prepares annual regulatory coordination programs. Another proposal 
concerns the establishment of sectoral working groups that will conceivably 
study the trade impact of more technical regulation in detail.7 Rather than being 
viewed as a barrier to transatlantic regulatory cooperation,8 as it was in the past, 
governance is now seen as a gateway to it. This may be due to the view that this 
“mega-regional”9 agreement would not be accepted by the European 
Parliament without deferring decisions on controversial regulatory issues, which 
is what many provisions in the regulatory coherence chapter will effectively do. 
At a time when many feel uncomfortable with the influence that 
 
regulatory cooperation).  
 5.  Article 8 of the EU negotiation text for the horizontal chapter of TTIP states, “The Parties 
hereby establish a bilateral mechanism . . . . ” European Commission, TTIP–Initial Provisions for 
CHAPTER [ ] – Regulatory Cooperation, May 4, 2015 [hereinafter Initial Provisions]. On February 10, 
2015, the European Commission made public several negotiation texts that were tabled for discussion 
with the United States in the negotiating round of February 2–6, 2015. On May 4, 2015 a slightly 
updated version was published on the website of DG Trade. These texts come with the disclaimer that 
“[t]he actual text in the final agreement will be a result of negotiations between the EU and US.” Id. 
 6.  See generally Anne Meuwese, EU–U.S. Horizontal Regulatory Cooperation: Mutual 
Recognition of Impact Assessment?, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: THE 
SHIFTING ROLES OF THE EU, THE US AND CALIFORNIA (David Vogel & Johan F.M. Swinnen eds., 
2011) (detailing earlier attempts to convergence on rulemaking procedures and impact assessment 
specifically).  
 7.  Initial Provisions, supra note 5, art. 14(4) at 14. 
 8.  See generally Jonathan R. Macey, US and EU Structures of Governance as Barriers to 
Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation, in PROBLEMS, supra note 1 (providing, with special attention to 
banking regulation, an overview of the potential obstacles that structures of governance in both Europe 
and the United States may pose to regulatory cooperation); DAVID VOGEL, BARRIERS OR BENEFITS? 
REGULATION IN TRANSATLANTIC TRADE (1997) (detailing sector-specific barriers to transatlantic 
trade, including governance-related ones such as inspection requirements).  
 9.  Polly Botsford, Global Free Trade in the 21st Century, IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT, Aug.–Sept., 
2014, at 16. 
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international norms have on their domestic legal systems,10 the problems 
regulatory cooperation poses for democratic legitimacy are being widely and 
openly debated—in academia, in the antiglobalization movement, and within a 
variety of institutions.11 These debates on regulatory cooperation center on the 
fear that regulatory coherence will amount to lower standards in the EU and 
will give lobbying groups more influence over the content of regulation at the 
expense of democratic and accountable institutions. However, stakeholders and 
politicians rarely phrase their concerns in constitutional terms, which means 
that potential protections or solutions stemming from concrete treaty 
provisions, principles, and case law may easily be overlooked. 
This article aims to address that lacuna. It suggests that regulatory 
cooperation—certainly horizontal regulatory cooperation, or cooperative 
endeavors that go beyond approximation of concrete rules and even specific 
sectors—is not solely an international law issue but also a matter of 
constitutional law.12 The main constitutional concerns can be grouped under two 
headings: (1) regulatory sovereignty, which refers to the right of sovereign 
entities to regulate as they see fit, and (2) democratic legitimacy, which refers to 
the idea that regulations should be promulgated by institutions accountable to 
voters. These worries might be aligned but need not be, because the first 
category assumes that too many constraints may arise on the part of domestic 
regulators whereas the second category hypothesizes that the production of 
binding rules, as it is being influenced by cooperative regulatory efforts, may 
face too few of these constraints. 
What makes regulatory cooperation a particularly salient constitutional 
problem is that insider–outsider demarcations have become fluid. The 
constituents and regulated parties within the legal system whose representatives 
are entering into regulatory cooperation agreements may be confronted with a 
loss of sovereignty and democratic accountability through those agreements. 
The agreements may also provide an opportunity, however, to set boundaries as 
to the sort of regulatory authority that may be deployed in regulatory 
cooperation settings and to transfer certain substantive and procedural 
preferences to a different legal system—an opportunity that is unavailable to 
stakeholders in “third countries,” who are affected by the outcomes of 
regulatory cooperation but are not parties to the negotiations. 
Some constitutional limits are clear-cut. Provisions in international 
agreements such as TTIP cannot create any new law-making or rule-making 
institutions, nor can they endow existing institutions with new law-making 
powers. At the same time, the United States and the EU would not bother with 
 
 10.  Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, When Structures Become Shackles: 
Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 740 (2014). 
 11.  Factsheet, European Comm’n, Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153002.1%20RegCo.pdf. 
 12.  See Petersmann, supra note 1, at 616. The two are intertwined. See generally Joris Larik, 
Shaping the International Order as a Union Objective and the Dynamic Internationalisation of 
Constitutional Law (Center for the Law of EU External Relations, Working Paper No. 2011/5, 2011).  
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an entire chapter on regulatory coherence, which consists of joint principles and 
procedures for cooperation, if the provisions were not expected to have effects 
on rulemaking or lawmaking, on both sides of the Atlantic. This article 
addresses the constitutional aspects of regulatory cooperation in two distinct 
analyses because the dynamic that lies behind the seemingly technical 
provisions from the proposed regulatory coherence chapter of TTIP is difficult 
to capture. First, this article discusses the constitutional implications of 
horizontal regulatory cooperation under TTIP. Mapping where the effects of 
horizontal regulatory cooperation are likely to be felt sheds light on the sort of 
constitutional limitations at play. Second, the article canvasses the 
constitutional limitations that arise from the EU treaties and the case law. Each 
of these two exercises is carried out for both the issue of regulatory sovereignty 
and the issue of democratic accountability. Although the underlying 
constitutional concerns apply to regulatory cooperation involving the EU 
generally, the propositions in the negotiation texts13 of the TTIP regulatory 
coherence chapter are used for reference. Concrete institutional propositions—
even if they have not yet been enacted—bring the concerns into sharper focus.14 
Comparisons to the institutional context in the United States will crystalize 
these concerns related to the European constitutional aspects of horizontal 
regulatory cooperation.15 The conclusion ultimately takes stock and identifies 
some opportunities for the development of the constitutional regulation of 
regulatory coherence in TTIP. 
II 
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATORY COHERENCE IN TTIP 
An explanatory text on the proposed regulatory coherence chapter from the 
European Commission contains the promise that “[t]he agreement will not 
 
 13.  Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 1. 
[G]iven that the provisions of this Chapter concern predominantly procedures for 
cooperation, they may not lend themselves to the application of dispute settlement rules. 
Alternative mechanisms for ensuring proper application could be explored . . . . As regards the 
sectoral provisions of the TTIP regulatory cluster, further reflection will be required as 
regards the most appropriate mechanisms of ensuring proper application. 
 Id. 
 14.  Although important constitutional questions also arise from the Investor–State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) debate, the scope of this article is limited to horizontal regulatory cooperation, 
which is not expected to fall under ISDS. This is not to say that ISDS, if included, will have no effects 
on regulation, but the provisions in the regulatory coherence chapter are unlikely to be enforced 
through this dispute resolution channel. 
 15.  Two extensive comparisons of the two legislative and regulatory systems have recently been 
made available to the public. See generally RICHARD PARKER & ALBERTO ALEMANNO, CENTRE FOR 
EUROPEAN POL’Y STUD., NO. 88, TOWARDS EFFECTIVE REGULATORY COOPERATION UNDER TTIP: 
A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE EU AND US LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY SYSTEMS (2014); 
Susan E. Dudley & Kai Wegrich, Achieving Regulatory Policy Objectives: An Overview and 
Comparison of U.S. and EU Procedures (Geo. Wash. Reg. Stud. Working Paper, March 2015), 
http://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/
Dudley%20Wegrich_US-EU_RegOverview_20150506_Rev.pdf.  
MEUWESE_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2016  1:25 PM 
No. 4 2015] CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF REGULATORY COHERENCE 157 
change the principles and the procedures set out in the EU treaties defining 
how our regulations should be made.”16 This reassurance prompts the question: 
Presuming that the lengthy negotiations are not for nothing, what will TTIP 
change, then? And, should the regulatory coherence chapter in TTIP be 
adopted, who will exercise what degree of influence over substantive regulatory 
outcomes? The following discussion of regulatory sovereignty addresses the 
scope of the intended regulatory coherence chapter, regulatory principles, 
regulatory analysis, and the idea for a “Regulatory Cooperation Body.” Then, 
the discussion of democratic accountability addresses democratic control and 
institutional balance, multilevel aspects, and transparency and participation. 
A. Implications for Regulatory Sovereignty 
International trade law inevitably limits EU decisionmaking.17 But is there 
anything in the regulatory coherence plans for TTIP that would prohibit EU 
institutions from adopting certain types of regulations or that would compel 
them to adopt others? 
1. Scope 
One clue regarding the envisaged hierarchy between agreements on specific 
rules and sectors and horizontal agreements regarding procedures may be 
found in the EC’s proposal to include a clause stipulating that “[i]n case of any 
inconsistency between the provisions of this Chapter and the provisions laid 
down in [specific or sectoral provisions concerning goods and services, to be 
identified], the latter shall prevail.”18 This provision clarifies that agreements on 
procedures flowing from the regulatory coherence chapter are secondary. Yet 
because the scope of applicability of this latter chapter is potentially very wide, 
the horizontal provisions on regulatory cooperation may have far-reaching 
effects on the content of regulations of various formal status. 
The EU’s Report of the Eighth Round of Negotiations for TTIP reveals that 
one point of disagreement between the EU and the United States concerns the 
scope of the regulatory coherence chapter.19 What type of law-making 
procedures are to be affected by approximation efforts? The United States 
 
 16.   EUROPEAN COMM’N, TTIP AND REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW 7  (2015) [hereinafter 
OVERVIEW], http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153121.1.2%20TTIP% 20and 
%20regulation%20overview.pdf. 
 17.  See Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, The Impact of the WTO on EU Decision-making, in 
THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 29–30 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne 
Scott eds., 2003) (tracing the impact of WTO norms on EU governance and policymaking). 
 18.  Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 4 (alterations in original). 
19. See Report of the Eighth Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (Brussels, 2–6 February 2015), at 4 (Mar. 5, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ 
docs/2015/february/tradoc_153175.pdf. This document reveals that when the EU negotiating team 
presented its draft proposal for a regulatory coherence chapter, it also reiterated its earlier concerns 
regarding the imbalance of the U.S. proposal, which allegedly sought to include only federal 
rulemaking on the U.S. side although including both EU and Member State legislation and regulations 
in its scope on the EU side. 
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seeks to include only federal agency rulemaking, whereas the EU thinks this 
limited inclusion amounts to an imbalance. If, on the EU side, legislative acts—
rules that require the approval of the European Parliament and the Council—
are to be included, a larger share of its rules would fall under the regulatory 
coherence chapter than is the case for the United States. If the United States 
gets its way, the EU and member-state legislation and regulations would fall 
under the scope of the horizontal provisions of the regulatory coherence 
chapter. The EU proposes this too, adding the clarification that only central 
government authorities at the member-state level should be covered, not local 
authorities, for instance.20 It is uncertain what the EC’s position on the EU 
scope will be if the inclusion of federal statutes on the U.S. side does not make 
it to the final agreement. 
As is apparent from the EU–U.S. disagreement on this point, the issue of 
the breadth of regulatory coherence is thorny. On one hand, a final treaty that 
includes federal statutes of the United States seems unlikely. The way in which 
the U.S. Congress goes about lawmaking is too far removed from the process 
assumed by the proposed provisions. Who would seriously expect Congress to 
start carrying out impact analyses as U.S. agencies do by way of compensation 
for its lack of direct democratic accountability in setting rules? On the other 
hand, what on its face appears to be a reasonable solution—the exclusion of EU 
legislation and legislative acts—in reality is quite unreasonable. Much of the 
EU primary legislation is regulatory; that is, prescriptive and detailed in nature. 
This is not surprising given that EU supranational lawmaking can be conceived 
of as a type of delegation, with the member states as principals and the EU 
institutions as agents. Finally, opting for a substantive criterion only, such as all 
measures of general application affecting goods and services with significant 
transatlantic impact,21 would make the provisions very difficult to enforce even 
if a strong role were given to a Regulatory Cooperation Body, because 
significant transatlantic impact is a matter of degree and this will normally only 
become apparent once the rules are in force. 
2. Regulatory Principles 
The draft preamble from the EU negotiation text states in part, “The Parties 
having regard to the importance of regulation to achieve public policy 
objectives, and their right to regulate and adopt measures to ensure that these 
objectives are protected at the level that each Party considers appropriate, in 
line with its respective principles.”22 Similarly, in the proposed Article 1(d)(3) a 
guarantee is in place that horizontal regulatory cooperation under TTIP will not 
restrict the right of each side to maintain, adopt, and apply measures to achieve 
legitimate public policy objectives, and in doing so, to apply the level of 
 
 20.  Initial Provisions, supra note 5, art. 4[c], at 4. 
 21.  Id. at art. 3(2), at 5. 
22.    Id. pmbl. 
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protection that each considers appropriate.23 
The textual proposal also mentions a “shared commitment to good 
regulatory principles and practices, such as those laid down in the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Recommendation 
of 22 March 2012 on Regulatory Policy and Governance.”24 If this commitment 
makes the final text and if the agreement is adopted, this would be the most 
formal endorsement of these OECD principles by the EU and the clearest step 
toward codification of better regulation principles and tools, such as 
transparency, consultation, or impact assessment, which has been signaled as 
one “indirect avenue” for “shaping the respective domestic regulatory 
process.”25 At the same time, buried in a footnote, but clearly phrased, the EU 
maintains that “[t]he provisions as set forth in this Chapter cannot be 
interpreted or applied as to oblige either Party to change its fundamental 
principles governing regulation in its jurisdiction, for example in the areas of 
risk assessment and risk management.”26 The wording of this proposal raises the 
question of what sets fundamental principles apart from regular ones. If we are 
to read “fundamental principles” as “constitutional principles,” the EC accepts 
the possibility of better regulation principles being at odds with the latter. 
Concretely, the OECD recommendation includes “net maximization of 
benefits” as a principle of good regulation. In many instances this principle is at 
odds with the precautionary principle—the idea that scientific uncertainty 
should not be a reason to avoid regulating in the public interest—and other 
objectives for regulation prioritized at a constitutional level in the EU. The EC 
has explicitly pointed to the constitutional entrenchment of the precautionary 
principle as a reason why this principle cannot be affected by TTIP.27 Yet as the 
precautionary principle already indicates, giving this principle teeth in the daily 
practice of EU lawmaking has been difficult. This difficulty makes it hard to 
determine whether a different flavor of regulatory analysis as a result of TTIP 
will have any impact on the precautionary principle. 
3. Regulatory Analysis 
The United States and the EU have previously attempted to find common 
ground in the way they approach the ex ante analysis of regulations.28 However, 
 
 23.  Id. at art. 1(d)(3), at 3. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Marija Bartl, TTIP’s Regulatory Cooperation Framework and its Democratic Implications, 
ACELG BLOG (Feb. 8, 2015), http://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/02/08/ttip%E2%80%99s-regulatory-
cooperation-framework-and-its-democratic-implications/ (summarizing the contribution by Alberto 
Alemanno to the workshop ‘Why TTIP? On its rationale, institutions and substantive areas,” that took 
place at the University of Amsterdam on February 17, 2015). 
 26.  Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 2 n.2. 
 27.  Karel De Gucht, European Trade Commissioner, Address at the Aspen Institute Prague 
Annual Conference: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—Solving the Regulatory 
Puzzle (Oct. 10, 2013) (transcript available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc 
_151822.pdf). The precautionary principle is codified in Article 191 TFEU, infra note 50. 
 28.  See, e.g., United States European Commission, High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, 
MEUWESE_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2016  1:25 PM 
160 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:153 
important dividing lines remain. For example, the United States would like the 
EC to make public draft impact assessments so that they can be a basis for 
consultation, a suggestion the EC regularly dismisses.29 Similarly, the United 
States often asserts the EU system contains too much methodological pluralism 
because the EU’s Impact Assessment Guidelines currently allow the official 
carrying out the assessment to decide how quantitative the analysis should be 
and how flexible the decision criteria should be.30 The EU responds to U.S. 
contentions with these issues by pointing out that some legislative initiatives are 
ill-suited to narrow economical evaluation, namely cost-benefit analysis, 
because of the nature of the problems they seek to address. If the EU has its 
way, impact analyses will have to be performed on U.S. federal statutes, which 
the EU has proposed to be included in the definition of “regulatory acts at 
central level”—an unlikely outcome.31 The EC textual proposal contains some 
interesting ideas on how to converge the way analytical tools such as impact 
assessment are applied in rulemaking procedures on both sides of the Atlantic; 
for instance, by making it obligatory to include information on the relationship 
between a new regulatory initiative and “relevant international instruments.”32 
What is not yet addressed in the Commission’s proposal is to what extent 
the impact on third-country citizens will be included under the assessment of 
trade implications expected to appear more prominently in regulatory analyses 
post-TTIP. Inevitably, if two large power blocks like the United States and the 
EU enter into regulatory cooperation talks, the results will impact legal systems 
not present at the negotiations. This mainly occurs when it comes to the 
voluntary adoption or spill-over effects of standards that result from regulatory 
cooperation on substantive issues.33 But as regulatory cooperation becomes 
proceduralized, meaning that parties defer agreements on regulatory content in 
favor of agreement on the procedures such as cost-benefit analysis and risk 
assessment through which regulation will be decided, it matters for third 
countries whether their interests are accounted for in these procedures. 
Regulatory analysis is generally meant to provide a counterweight against 
powerful regulatory rent-seekers, but in a bilateral regulatory cooperation 
context with multilateral consequences, regulatory analysis could also help 
 
Common Understanding on Regulatory Principles and Best Practices (2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/common-understanding-on-regulatory-
principles-and-best-practices.pdf; Meuwese, supra note 6 (discussing previous efforts). 
 29.  Comments of the United States Government on the 2014 Revision of the European 
Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines, Public Consultation Document (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/useu/231771/PDFs/USAresponseIA_final.pdf (referring to the OECD 
Recommendation). 
 30.  Commission Staff Working Document on Better Regulation Guidelines, COM (2015) 215 final 
(May 19, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf. 
 31.  Dudley & Wegrich, supra note 15. 
 32.  Initial Provisions, supra note 5, art. 7(2) at 7. 
 33.   See, e.g., Pauwelyn, Wessel & Wouters, supra note 10, at 752–53 (explaining the de facto 
adoption of standards set by the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use by countries like Brazil or China).  
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“address claims of an emerging gap between regulatory jurisdiction and 
regulatory impact, which is particularly significant when it comes to the actions 
of industrialized states.”34 The Commission mentions in its Better Regulation 
Guidelines35 the possibility that EU regulations impact third countries but it is 
unclear to what extent this occurs. 
4. A Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB) 
A final major area of impact on regulatory sovereignty for the EU is the 
establishment of new bodies. The published negotiation texts mention a “Joint 
Ministerial Body” at the political level.36 Though it is unclear exactly what this 
body would do, it could have a role in enforcing the provisions of the regulatory 
coherence chapter. Much more detailed are the proposed provisions regarding 
the RCB, whose most important task is envisaged to be 
the preparation and publication of an Annual Regulatory Co-operation Programme 
reflecting common priorities of the Parties and the outcomes of past or ongoing 
regulatory cooperation initiatives under section III of this Chapter, including 
information on the follow-up, the steps envisaged and timeframes proposed in relation 
to these identified common priorities.
37
 
The RCB would also monitor the implementation of the provisions of the 
entire regulatory coherence chapter and report to the Joint Ministerial Body. 
Furthermore, it would consider new initiatives for regulatory cooperation “on 
the basis of input from either Party or its stakeholders,” prepare initiatives and 
proposals, ensure transparency, and examine other issues.38 The RCB and the 
Joint Ministerial Body could also create “sectoral working groups” and delegate 
certain tasks to them. 
Much is unclear regarding the envisaged composition of the RCB, which has 
caused outcries from several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that 
“business will get a direct seat at the table.”39 The textual proposal implies that 
 
 34.  Alberto Alemanno, Is There a Role for Cost-Benefit Analysis Beyond the Nation-State? 
Lessons from International Regulatory Cooperation, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 113 (Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds., 2013) 
(regarding the term “external accountability gap”). 
 35.  These guidelines contain information on how Commission Services conduct impact 
assessments. A new version of the Guidelines was adopted as part of the Juncker Commission’s “Better 
Regulation Package” on May 19, 2015, replacing the Impact Assessment Guidelines. 
 36.  The name “Joint Ministerial Body” does not clearly convey which politicians or officials would 
take part, because the term “minister” may not mean the same on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 37.  Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 11. 
 38.  Id. Article 14-3 proposes an exception to the central role of the Joint Ministerial Body: “In the 
domain of financial services the functions as set out under in paragraph 2 shall be performed by the 
[Joint EU/US Financial Regulatory Forum (FRF)], which shall ensure appropriate information to the 
RCB.” 
 39.  To cite one illustrative concern that does not appear to have much basis in the EU’s textual 
proposals: “The Commissioner wants to farm out the formulation of new regulations and laws to a sort 
of ‘Secret Council’ composed of those with a direct interest . . . Who would sit on that body isn’t clear . . 
. .” TTIP ‘Secret Council’ Neither Democratic nor Transparent, DUTCH  SOCIALIST PARTY (Feb. 10, 
2015), http://international.sp.nl/news/2015/02/ttip-secret-council-neither-democratic-nor-transparent 
(quoting Anne-Marie Mineur). 
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the RCB will not receive a stakeholder platform along the lines of the EU’s 
High Level Working Group on Administrative Burdens. Rather, the provision 
mentions that the RCB “shall be composed of representatives of both Parties.” 
Given that elsewhere in the text the Parties and “its stakeholders” are so clearly 
distinguished, it appears unlikely that a stakeholder could be a representative. 
However, the next sentence, “It shall be co-chaired by senior representatives of 
regulators and competent authorities, regulatory coordination activities and 
international trade matters,” appears to leave some room for members from 
outside the respective administrations if regulatory coordination activities 
include platforms such as the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue and the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue.40 An annual stakeholder meeting with the 
purpose of exchanging views on the Annual Regulatory Cooperation Program 
is also proposed, to “be prepared jointly by the co-chairs of the RCB and which 
shall involve [] the co-chairs of the Civil Society Contact Groups, including a 
balanced representation of business, consumers, trade unions, environmental 
groups and other relevant public interest associations . . . .”41 The Commission’s 
proposal repeatedly states that “[t]he RCB will not have the power to: adopt 
legal acts” or “interfere with any domestic EU or US regulatory procedures.”42 
It appears that two points will be of crucial importance for the constitutional 
implications of this novel tool for horizontal regulatory cooperation. First, the 
RCB’s interaction with the political Joint Ministerial Body is critical because 
the permanent status of the RCB may be instrumental in suppressing the 
tendency within many more political bodies to let activities take place in 
negotiation mode. Although, if the Joint Ministerial Body receives a heavy role 
in resolving disagreements, politicization will dominate. Second, the extent to 
which the RCB will manage to operate in a transparent manner remains critical. 
As the Commission has stated, the RCB would exist to share knowledge, not to 
make decisions in any formal sense.43 But how and with whom this knowledge is 
shared will be the crucial question, especially if representation by the member 
states is lacking. A fundamental difference between the EU’s constitutional 
structure and that of the United States, after all, is that the EU institutions do 
not represent a comprehensive federation of states. 
B. Implications for Democratic Accountability 
1. Democratic control and institutional balance 
Many of the issues of democratic accountability arising from horizontal 
 
 40.  Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 12. 
 41.  Id. Article 15-2 states that “[p]articipation of stakeholders shall not be conditional on them 
being directly affected by the items on the agenda of each meeting.” Id. 
 42.  EUROPEAN COMM’N, Introduction to the EU Legal Text on Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP 2 
(2015). Article 14-2(c) repeats “[t]he RCB will not have the power to adopt legal acts.” Id. at 11. 
 43.  EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 42 (“A joint body would act as a forum to share ideas and 
plan cooperation on new technologies and risks and our regulatory responses to them. The body would 
provide a forum for exchanges between regulators on these types of questions.”). 
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regulatory cooperation are similar to the constitutional concerns associated with 
networked governance in general.44 Dutch Members of Parliament tabled a 
motion asking the Dutch government to promote the exclusion of regulatory 
cooperation from the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and 
TTIP trade agreements. They based this on their observation that these treaties 
may stipulate mandatory stakeholder consultation, which in their opinion is a 
violation of the democratic decisionmaking process.45 Interestingly, mistaken 
translation—pointed out by the Minister of Trade herself46—of “businesses” 
instead of “stakeholders” in an earlier version of the motion47 reveal its main 
underlying worry: regulatory capture by powerful and wealthy companies. The 
motion was not adopted by the Parliament.48 
Hesitation regarding open forms of consultation, in which the participants 
are not pre-selected or filtered in any way and which thereby may give an unfair 
advantage to those with the greatest resources, exist in continental Europe 
among several political circles. The most alarming messages come from circles 
that are skeptical of globalization, but the more moderate alarmists have plenty 
to say on the matter as well: 
This process will take place outside the regular democratic decision-making processes 
on both sides of the Atlantic, preventing national parliaments and locally elected 
bodies from being fully involved, and dangerously limiting the public debate. Good 
ideas for regulation in the public interest could be stopped before they are even 
discussed by an  elected body.
49
 
This sort of statement boils down to a complaint that the European 
Parliament has long had about EU lawmaking in general.50 The Commission’s 
textual proposal contains a placeholder for interaction with legislative bodies, 
no doubt because it is one of the trickiest issues.51 The possible implications for 
 
 44.  Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks Accountable, 
in PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 522–25. 
 45.  Tweede Kamer [Dutch Parliament, Second Chamber], 21501-02, no. 1438 (2014–15), 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1438.html.  
 46.  Tweede Kamer [Dutch Parliament, Second Chamber], 21501-02, Reports (Handelingen) no. 26 
(2014–15), https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20142015-26-8.html. 
 47.  Tweede Kamer [Dutch Parliament, Second Chamber], 21501-02, no. 1432 (2014–15), 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1432.html. 
 48.  Tweede Kamer [Dutch Parliament, Second Chamber], 21501-02, Reports (Handelingen) no. 21 
(2014–15), https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/handelingen/TK/2014-2015/28/h-tk-20142015-28-
21?resultIndex=12&sorttype=1&sortorder=4. 
 49.  Corporate Europe Observatory, TTIP: Covert Attacks on Democracy and Regulation 1–2 
(2014), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/ttip_covert_attacks.pdf. 
 50.  The European Parliament is involved in the TTIP negotiations, which are not discussed 
extensively here because the focus of this article is on what will happen if TTIP is adopted. See 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 207(3) & art. 
218(10), Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) [hereinafter TFEU] (information gathering). The Commission 
is obliged to report to the European Parliament on progress. See Frank Hoffmeister, The Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements of the European Union: Concept and Challenges, in TRADE 
LIBERALISATION AND STANDARDISATION—NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE ‘LOW POLITICS’ OF EU 
FOREIGN POLICY 19 (Marise Cremona & Tamara Takács eds., 2014).  
 51.  Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 14. 
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the institutional balance are plentiful: Will de facto regulatory authority migrate 
to a transatlantic forum of executive governance? And will it cease to be based 
on EU primary law? As the current textual proposals stand, it is quite likely 
that the executive branch, comprised of the Commission, will gain power at the 
expense of the legislature, the European Parliament or Council. 
2. Multilevel Aspects 
Much is still unknown about the extent to which lower levels of regulatory 
decisionmaking in the EU—member states or even regional and local levels—
will be included in the regulatory coherence chapter. The text from December 
23, 2014 includes the following wording: 
“[R]egulators and competent authorities at non-central level” means: 
i.   For the EU, the national authorities of an EU Member State responsible for the 
preparation of regulatory acts at non-central level; 
ii. For the US, the authorities at State level responsible for the preparation of 
regulatory acts at non-central level.
52
 
In the text from January 23, 2015, that provision had been eliminated and 
the following wording had been added to the general notes section: 
This draft covers regulatory acts at“‘central” level, understood as EU-level and US 
Federal acts. However, the draft also envisages the possibility to discuss, upon request, 
on other regulatory acts, in particular, those adopted by the central national 
authorities of EU Member States or by US States. Cooperation on those other 
regulatory acts may need to be addressed further, in order to achieve the objective of 
enhancing regulatory cooperation, including in light of the discussions in particular in 
sectors. The EU reserves the possibility of tabling specific proposals in this regard.
53
 
In the published version of February 10, 2015, the wording of the general 
note has been changed to: 
[I]n particular, this draft covers regulatory acts at “central” level, understood as EU-
level and US Federal acts. It includes also placeholders for regulatory acts of US 
States and of the central national authorities of EU Member States, which will be 
covered in a revised version of this draft chapter in order to provide a balanced and 
comprehensive coverage of relevant regulations.54 
Ideas to include municipalities and regional authorities, which would further 
complicate the definition of regulation and possibly broaden the scope of 
regulatory cooperation, were taken off the agenda conclusively when the EC 
published its proposal for a definition on “non-central” acts.55 
3. Transparency and a “Right to Lobby”? 
Participation and dialogue have been part of transatlantic regulatory 
 
 52.  Initial Provisions for TTIP Chapter [ ] on Regulatory Cooperation 1 (Dec. 23, 2014) 
[hereinafter December Initial Provisions], http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/231214_ 
regulatory_coherence_draft_proposal.pdf.  
 53.  Initial Provisions for TTIP Chapter [ ] on Regulatory Cooperation 1 (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ttip-eu-regulatory-coherence-draft-proposal-
23.01.15.pdf. 
54.   Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 1. 
 55.  See December Initial Provisions, supra note 51.  
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cooperation from the beginning,56 but TTIP has drawn a lot of attention to the 
phenomenon. The “right to lobby,”57 a phrase coined by NGOs that despise 
TTIP, describes the alleged ambition of certain business stakeholders to 
“essentially co-write regulation.”58 The worry is that “transatlantic regulation 
might in the near future be more shaped by political leaders, rent-seeking 
interest groups, and legislators than by networks of technocrats.”59 But how 
much access do stakeholders such as businesses and NGOs get under the 
Commission’s proposal? Article 6 on stakeholder consultations addresses the 
extent of this access: 
When preparing regulatory acts at central level undergoing impact assessment, the 
regulating Party shall offer a reasonable opportunity for any interested natural or legal 
person, on a non-discriminatory basis, to provide input through a public consultation 
process, and shall take into account the contributions received in the finalisation of 
their regulatory acts. The regulating Party should make use of electronic means of 
communication and seek to use dedicated single access webportals, where possible.
60
 
Here, the main point of contention between the EU and the United States is 
not so much about the degree of access as it is about timing and transparency. 
The U.S. input for the public consultation on the Commission’s consultation 
guidelines—which is unrelated to TTIP but gives a good idea of the U.S. 
position on this issue—demonstrated that having draft impact assessments 
available to contextualize stakeholder input is important to the United States.61 
On this point the EC has recently given in somewhat to the United States—
formally outside of the TTIP context—by announcing that it will start 
publishing “inception impact assessments.”62 
 
 56.  See Tamara Takács, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation in Trade: Objectives, Challenges and 
Instruments of Economic Governance, in A TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY OF LAW: LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND U.S. LEGAL ORDERS 175 (Elaine 
Fahey & Deirdre Curtin eds., 2014) (giving an overview of different mechanisms).   
 57.  Corporate Europe Observatory, supra note 49, at 4. 
 58.  The allegation is based on this document placed on its website by an anti–TTIP NGO: U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce & BUSINESSEUROPE, Regulatory Cooperation in the EU–US Economic 
Agreement (Oct. 2012), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/businesseurope-uschamber-
paper.pdf. 
 59.  Lütz, supra note 4. 
 60.  Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 5. 
 61.  Comments of the United States Government on the European Commission’s Public 
Consultation Document for Stakeholder Consultation Guidelines 2014 (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/useu/231771/PDFs/USresponseConsultGuidelinesfinal.pdf; see also 
Shawn Donnan, U.S. Pushes for Greater Transparency in EU Business Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 23, 
2014, 12:03 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6e9b7190-9a65-11e3-8e06-00144feab7de.html#axzz 
3VXHWBQIB. 
 62.  European Commission, Better Regulation for Better Results—an EU Agenda(May 19 2015), 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/better_regulation/documents/com_2015_215_en.pdf. All the Initial 
Provisions mention on the subject is:  
Article 5—Early information on planned acts   
1.  Each Party shall make publicly available at least once a year a list of planned regulatory 
acts at central level, providing information on their respective scope and objectives. 
2.  For planned regulatory acts at central level undergoing impact assessment each Party shall 
make publicly available, as early as possible, information on planning and timing leading to 
their adoption, including on planned stakeholder consultations and potential for significant 
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III 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF REGULATORY COHERENCE IN TTIP 
When the negotiation documents do consider constitutional aspects of the 
regulatory coherence chapter, they focus on the possibility that TTIP would 
undermine the EU treaties or member state constitutions that lay down the 
right of governments to make laws and regulations in the public interest—and 
reassure that this will not be the case.63 This part argues that the treaties and 
Constitutions involved are not only something “not to undermine,” but they are 
something for TTIP to actively involve. The limitations discussed below are 
relevant to TTIP, even quite apart from the question of what a court would do 
with these limitations after TTIP’s adoption. 
The following addresses the principle of conferral, the constitutional 
limitations regarding regulatory objectives and principles, and the exclusive 
right of initiative of the European Commission. Subsequently, the democratic-
accountability issues of delegation and participation are discussed. 
A. Limitations regarding Regulatory Sovereignty 
1. The Principle of Conferral 
The regulatory powers of the EU are defined vis-à-vis the member states. 
The principle of conferral64 means that the EU cannot legislate or regulate 
without explicit conferral by the member states. Powers not conferred on the 
EU remain with the member states. The assumption is that whatever the 
internal distribution of powers between the EU and the member states, 
together they are sovereign. That is, it is assumed that the EU and member 
states jointly have the exclusive power to regulate within their territory. Third 
parties de facto influencing the EU or member-state enactment of legislation or 
regulations simply do not fall within this scheme. This understanding of 
regulatory sovereignty means that for full coverage of possible regulatory trade 
barriers to appear on the radar, regulatory acts at the non-central level would 
have to be included, because there is no way for the EU to acquire new 
legislative (and thereby regulatory) powers without treaty revision. This in turn 
would make it very difficult for the Commission to stave off claims that TTIP is 
a “mixed agreement,” which means that the member states are co-signatories.65 
2. Regulatory Objectives and Principles 
Which principles, provisions, and case law limit the EU legislator’s capacity 
 
impacts on trade or investment. 
Initial Provisions, supra note 5, art. 5. 
 63.  Initial Provisions, supra note 5, art. 1(d)(3) at 3. 
 64.  Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 4-1 & 5-2, 992 O.J. (C224) 1, 
(signed at Maastricht), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU]. 
 65.  Letter from Maroš Šefovi, Vice President, European Commission, to Presidents and Chairmen 
of European Commission (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/files/ 
download/082dbcc54c03415b014c09447e0904f0.do. 
MEUWESE_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2016  1:25 PM 
No. 4 2015] CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF REGULATORY COHERENCE 167 
to curtail its own regulatory leeway? This section focuses on the EC, self-
appointed as the regulator in the published negotiation text at the central level 
in the EU. In stating that “neither side is going to renounce the right to regulate 
in [the] future to reach the level of protection that their citizens choose,”66 the 
EC ignores that constitutional and self-regulatory limitations on its regulatory 
sovereignty already exist. 
Much literature on comparative regulatory studies discusses diverging 
regulatory philosophies on either side of the Atlantic. There are constitutional 
aspects to these philosophies, even apart from the issue of the precautionary 
principle, in the sense that the Treaty prescribes certain regulatory goals: 
Article 3 of the TEU lists the general objectives of the Union, which include 
“balanced economic growth and price stability,” “a highly competitive social 
market economy,” “full employment and social progress,” and “a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment.”67 Additionally, 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union mentions more specific 
regulatory goals, such as “developing a coordinated strategy for employment 
and particularly for promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and 
labor markets responsive to economic change”68 and “the promotion of 
employment, improved living and working conditions.”69 The codification of 
these regulatory objectives in the Treaty in combination with the 
aforementioned principle of conferral means that these expressions of EU 
regulatory philosophies are not mere public policy objectives subject to change 
with the political tide, but constitutionally entrenched directions and limitations 
for regulation. 
3. The Commission’s Right of Initiative 
The Commission enjoys the exclusive right of initiative in the legislative 
context at the EU level, which means that no other institution may put forward 
a legislative proposal. The European Parliament can try to press the 
Commission through the adoption of resolutions, but it does not share the 
constitutional right of initiative. 
One major constitutional issue to consider is to what extent the EC can limit 
itself in the exercise of its legislative right of initiative. This is relevant to the 
TTIP regulatory coherence chapter because committing to a certain type of 
consultation procedure as standard practice may imply such a limitation. The 
 
 66.  Karel De Gucht, European Trade Commissioner, Address at the Aspen Institute Prague 
Annual Conference: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—Solving the Regulatory 
Puzzle (Oct. 10, 2013) (transcript available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/ 
october/tradoc_151822.pdf). The precautionary principle is codified in TFEU art. 191. 
 67.  TEU art. 3. 
 68.  TFEU art. 145. 
 69.  TFEU art. 151. Other examples include culture (Title XIII), Public Health (Title XIV), 
Consumer Protection (Title XV), and Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion (Title XVIII). See 
also Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 2 (“[T]he environment; consumers; public health; working 
conditions; social protection and social security; human, animal and plant life; animal welfare; health 
and safety; personal data; cybersecurity; cultural diversity; and preserving financial stability.”).  
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relevant case law originates from previous attempts at horizontal regulatory 
cooperation between the United States and the EU. In 2004, the European 
Court of Justice (CJEU) decided a case in which France challenged the legality 
of the Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency. 70 It held that 
instruments of regulatory cooperation between the EU and the United States 
have to respect underlying principles of the division of powers, institutional 
balance, and the need an adequate legal basis.71 In this case, these limitations 
did not result in annulment of the Guidelines. The Court instead accepted the 
Commission’s argument that the right of initiative includes the ability to hold 
any consultations it considers necessary; and further, that this does not amount 
to an infringement of the Commission’s sole right to initiate legislation, as 
France had argued.72 The argument endorsed by the Advocate-General is that 
when the Commission concludes arrangements to steer the consultation along 
particular defined paths, it is exercising rather than restricting its right of 
initiative. The Advocate-General ended his opinion with an emphasis on the 
“duty to discuss the effects of any rules envisaged with American trading 
partners before such rules are proposed to the European legislature,” which 
preempts any conclusion that there is an infringement of the Commission’s right 
of initiative.73 
The EU system for the protection of fundamental rights, specifically the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, is a further limitation 
on the European legislator’s space to regulate—and thus indirectly the agenda-
setting power of the RCB. One example of a concrete limitation is Article 8(3) 
of the Charter, which requires that personal data be retained by an independent 
authority. One of the reasons the CJEU repealed the EU Data Retention 
Directive was that it did not require the data in question to be retained within 
the EU. Without such a localization obligation, the Court has reasoned, an 
essential component of the protection of individuals regarding the processing of 
personal data remained unfulfilled.74 This illustrates that the Charter contains 
built-in restrictions on the content of EU legislation. The proposed approach to 
regulatory coherence in TTIP risks setting up the assessment of trade impacts of 
regulation as a track separate from regular regulatory scrutiny and thus 
overlooking the fundamental rights component. 
 
 70.  Case 233/02, French Republic v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 2004 E.C.R. I-2759. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  There is only one other EU case directly concerning regulatory cooperation that dealt with the 
Council’s exclusive competence to conclude international agreements. See Case 327/91, France v. 
Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. I-3641. 
 73.  Case C-233/02, French Republic v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 2003 E.C.R. I-2762 
(opinion of Advocate-General Alber). 
 74.  Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’n, Marine and Nat. Res., 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Commissioner of the Garda Siochána, Ireland, The 
Attorney Gen., and Irish Human Rights Comm’n, [2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Apr. 8, 2014).   
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B. Limitations regarding Democratic Accountability 
The EU’s commitment to democracy runs through the text of both EU 
treaties, starting with the preambles, Article 2 TEU, and the provisions on the 
legislative procedure and the citizens’ initiative. The EU constitutional 
framework contains elements of parliamentary, deliberative, participatory, and 
multilevel democracy.75 
1. Delegation 
One strand of constitutional limitations concerns the leeway for delegating 
legislative power to bodies that are not mentioned in the treaties—the TEU and 
the TFEU. The treaties are silent on the establishment of agencies and 
networks. Agencies are usually established by secondary law on the basis of a 
specific treaty provision. Cooperative bodies producing nonbinding regulation 
are common in the EU; for example, the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, which is a body of the European Commission that unites all national 
“data protection watchdogs” and is the European data protection supervisor.76 
Many recent developments in producing EU regulation have occurred in the 
area of delegated lawmaking due to the changes brought about by the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009.77 However, what goes into primary legislation and rulemaking78 
is not always clear nor logical nor parallel to the U.S. system. A further problem 
pertains to the high level of unpredictability surrounding the choice between 
delegated acts and implementing measures and the resulting regulatory 
procedure. In 2014 the European Commission brought an action for annulment 
before the CJEU, arguing that the biocides regulation should have been a 
formal delegated act and not just an implementing measure.79 The two types of 
EU rulemaking represent mutually exclusive categories, or so the Commission 
argued. The European Parliament and Council won the day, however, when the 
Court, curiously referring to the Constitutional Treaty, which was never 
adopted, allowed for a certain amount of discretion on the part of the 
legislature.80 
 
 75.  TEU, arts. 9–12; see also TEU art. 21:  
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the 
wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, 
and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. 
 76.  For additional information on the Article 29 Working Party see 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/index_en.htm.  
 77.  C. Boyden Gray, Upgrading Existing Regulatory Mechanisms for Transatlantic Regulatory 
Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at 35 (“[D]elegated acts present a vehicle for 
increased accountability and transparency as well as systematic consideration of transatlantic economic 
effects. Increasing transparency, accountability, and stakeholder participation in the EC’s development 
of proposed regulations and directives, however, remains even more important to achieving the shared 
objective of transatlantic regulatory compatibility.”). 
 78.  “Non-legislative acts” in EU legal jargon. 
79.  Case C-427/12, 18 March 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:170.  
80.    Id. 
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In some U.S. case law, delegation of government authority to a private 
entity and a nongovernmental arbitrator has been deemed unconstitutional 
“because such a delegation gave those entities ‘an effective veto’ over 
government action.”81 Comparable case law in the EU is lacking, because the 
constitutional limits formulated by the CJEU over the past decades have been 
so strict as to prevent attempts to delegate regulatory authority to private 
entities altogether. In its Meroni judgment,82 the CJEU established that the 
delegation of powers must be confined to a clearly defined executive power and 
may not involve a wide range of discretion. Consequently, the delegation of 
general rule-making powers to agencies is forbidden. In its recent judgment, the 
CJEU loosened these criteria by accepting that the European Securities and 
Markets Authority instead of the EC has the power to draft technical rules if 
the legislative framework is sufficiently detailed.83 Given the clear requirement 
of a detailed legislative framework, this case does not directly open any door to 
de-facto delegation to an RCB, but it does show that the EU constitutional 
framework is more susceptible to delegation of regulatory powers as a matter of 
degree rather than kind. 
2. Participation 
Participation and transparency norms, as directly applicable, foundational, 
and democratic principles upon which the EU is founded, were codified in the 
Lisbon Treaty.84 Further, these principles have become operationalized through 
a myriad of specific procedures. When examined in light of EU receptiveness to 
international standards, precisely the procedural rules meant to give effect to 
constitutional norms regarding openness and participation are at risk of being 
bypassed for lack strong constitutional entrenchment.85 This situation is at odds 
with the promotion of “good global governance,” which—inherently vague as it 
may be—is an objective of the EU external policy.86 The most tangible 
protection for participation in a legislative or regulatory context consists of soft 
law: The Commission’s Minimum Standards on Consultation, which are not 
judicially enforceable in any way. EU constitutional protections are weak in the 
area of participation. This may also mean that the TTIP’s regulatory coherence 
chapter has a large role to play as a catalyst for affecting EU decisionmaking. 
 
 81.  See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
735  (citing Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2013)) (giving an 
overview of judicial review of regulatory cooperation efforts by U.S. agencies). 
 82.  Case 9-56, Meroni v. High Authority, 1958 E.C.R. [133].  
 83.  Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, [2014] E.C.R. I___ (delivered 
January 22, 2014). 
 84.   See TEU arts. 10(3), 11; see also TFEU arts. 15(1), 298(1). 
 85.  Joana Mendes, EU Law and Global Regulatory Regimes: Hollowing Out Procedural 
Standards?, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 988, 1010 (2012). 
 86.  TEU. art. 21(2)(h). 
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IV 
CONCLUSION 
The idea behind the current set of proposals on horizontal regulatory 
cooperation within TTIP is that constitutional implications will be minimal and 
therefore the constitutional limitations need not be invoked: “Once TTIP is 
adopted, regulatory cooperation will not change the way each side makes 
regulation. Both sides are expected to exercise transparency toward each other 
and to the public in making known their regulatory intentions. This will support 
more informative interaction among regulators and promote better regulatory 
outcomes.”87 
This article demonstrates that even if few direct changes to fundamental 
aspects of EU legislative and regulatory decisionmaking are embedded in the 
most recent drafts of TTIP, the drafts’ various implications for regulatory 
sovereignty and democratic accountability have constitutional implications. On 
the one hand, TTIP does not formally alter the parties’ adoption procedures for 
legislation and rules; there is no intention to amend the EU or U.S. 
constitutional systems or to craft joint decision-making power. On the other 
hand, in practice, TTIP may erode the Commission’s right to initiate legislation 
because the case law on horizontal regulatory cooperation actually encourages 
concluding agreements that dictate how to consult on and analyze regulatory 
initiatives. The analysis also illustrates how many of the potential erosions and 
limitations of regulatory sovereignty and democratic accountability are actually 
self-inflicted on the part of the EC. 
Is the Commission still free in the definition and content of legislative 
measures? On this point, the EU treaties heavily regulate this space due to the 
principle of conferral and the inclusion of regulatory objectives and principles 
such as the precautionary principle. The proposed additional institutional 
structures will likely increase regulators’ awareness of the extraterritorial 
impact of their decisions for they imply additional analysis in this regard. The 
RCB and working groups will provide a forum in which regulators can discuss 
all sorts of regulations and their implementation. There are certainly 
advantages to this socialization because “[TTIP] will counter the litigious and 
confrontational culture of the WTO, where the EU and the USA find 
themselves typically as rivals and antagonists.”88 However, the resulting de facto 
deference to transnational experts calls for constitutional regulation. 
Can the EU constitutional framework regulate horizontal regulatory 
cooperation with the United States? The planned regulatory coherence chapter 
has a unique role in TTIP. One might describe it as one large placeholder in the 
entire agreement. Specific regulatory approximations that cannot be agreed 
upon during the negotiations as well as future regulatory initiatives are 
 
 87.  OVERVIEW, supra note 16, at 7. 
 88.  Joseph Weiler, Editorial, The International Society for Public Law—Call for Papers and 
Panels; Van Gend en Loos—50th Anniversary; Vital Statistics; Roll of Honour; Quantitative Empirical 
International Legal Scholarship in this Issue, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 961, 963 (2014). 
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subjected to a horizontal cooperative mechanism. This is in line with the idea 
that TTIP should be a “living agreement,” but it also makes regulatory 
cooperation, as approached procedurally, particularly difficult for constitutional 
arrangements to regulate. 
A major issue to be solved in the negotiations is whether to include primary 
legislation, such as statutes and legislative acts, as well as non-central 
legislation, such as member state laws and regulations. It remains to be seen if 
the new inception impact assessments do enough to meet the U.S. demand for 
an increase in timely transparency for the preparation of legislative and 
regulatory acts. No case law concludes that committing to early publication of 
draft impact assessments would constitute a violation of the Commission’s right 
of initiative. This may be different if horizontal regulatory cooperation develops 
to include substantive decision criteria at odds with the limitative regulatory 
objectives in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The largest 
implications concern the institutional apparatus envisaged. Here, the EU 
constitutional framework lacks the tools to regulate socialization of regulatory 
actors involved. 
Given the constitutional framework that deals with competence in a fairly 
formalistic way, and given the uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of the 
horizontal regulatory provisions in particular, it is worth considering how the 
EU constitutional framework could be strengthened to better handle structural, 
horizontal regulatory cooperation.89 Because the institutional aspect of EU law 
is under siege by the demands of practical problem solving, namely the 
economic need for regulatory cooperation, constitutional law should aim to 
regulate the risk that voluntary convergence de facto turns into circumvention 
of the properly competent legislative or regulatory bodies. Some of these bodies 
themselves are involved, although as of yet it is not clear which sub-bodies will 
be active in regulatory exchanges. For instance, will the concrete actors have a 
trade background? Or will they be regulators—a word that the EU textual 
proposal uses frequently? 
In search of solutions for the lack of clarity regarding the actual impact of 
horizontal regulatory cooperation in TTIP, it may be useful to view the risks 
associated with the establishment of an RCB or equivalent body as an 
information problem and not as a sovereignty problem in the first instance. The 
Trade Commissioner has argued that “[a]mbitious regulatory cooperation helps 
us make better decisions because regulators can share expertise and data.”90 
Because the European Commission clearly frames the institutional advantages 
of TTIP in terms of information exchange, it can be called upon to ground such 
 
 89.  Bengt Jacobsson, Regulated Regulators: Global Trends of State Transformation, in 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 205–24 (Marie-Laure 
Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2006); Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional 
Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 1 (2011). 
 90.  Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Trade, Address at Berlin–SPD Conference: 
Transatlantic Free Trade Opportunities and Risks, TTIP: Freedom and Responsibility 3 (Feb. 23, 
2015). 
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sharing of regulatory and other data in sound procedures. Handling regulatory 
information in such a way that it increases accountability is not self-evident. For 
example, the former Impact Assessment Board has poor track record in user 
friendliness—its opinions can only be found in a non-searchable specialized 
system rather than the regular legislative databases. For the regulatory 
coherence chapter in TTIP this means that the EC should propose more than 
public accessibility of RCB meeting agendas.91 Designing structures to optimize 
in the interest of citizens, information, and best-practices exchange is one of the 
urgent challenges for contemporary public law,92 and a challenge for which 
regulatory cooperation efforts have an opportunity to be at the forefront.93 In 
the EU context there have been some efforts at recognizing the centrality of 
data or information in the exercise of public power. For example, the Research 
Network on EU Administrative Law, an academic, administrative law 
codification project, has devoted two books to mutual assistance between 
administrative bodies and administrative information management.94 
Perhaps democratically elected bodies on both sides of the Atlantic can take 
some inspiration from the influence on European decisionmaking that national 
parliaments gained over the years. Once deemed impossible, many EU national 
parliaments now have some degree of direct influence on what their 
government minister is deciding in the EU Council of Ministers. All of the 
mechanisms established to facilitate this newly won influence, such as 
obligatory information notes (impact fiches) and the so-called yellow card that 
allows a collectivity of national parliaments to force the EC to reconsider a 
legislative proposal, are information based. Now that the European Parliament 
and the member states have become more involved through the Council with 
the Commission’s work program, perhaps they should strive to do the same 
with the Annual Regulatory Cooperation Program. 
But the information streams should also be regulated to engage and protect 
citizens. If the Commission is serious about keeping corporate influence over 
legislation at bay, it should commit to increased transparency. Part of the 
implementation phase of regulatory coherence within TTIP—provided that this 
treaty ever enters into force—will necessarily remain obscured. What is being 
discussed in regulatory exchanges and RCB meetings will be extremely difficult 
 
 91.  Initial Provisions, supra note 13, at 12 (“[A]genda and the minutes of the meetings of the RCB 
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or impossible to make visible—absent in-depth empirical research. Exploring 
how involved regulators will deal with the accountability–independence 
dilemma—that they will need on the one hand a sufficient degree of 
accountability toward their domestic constituencies, while on the other hand, a 
sufficient degree of mutual trust that they do not arrive to the dialogue table 
with the exclusive aim of representing their domestic stakeholders and voters—
provides a potential research agenda for both socio-legal and public-law 
scholars. 
 
